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**SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE EMERGENCE OF A POTENTIAL
SOLUTION TO PEACE-KEEPING AND A PROPOSED MILITARY
MODEL IN SUPPORT OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION ON
THE SUB-CONTINENT**

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**SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE EMERGENCE OF A POTENTIAL SOLUTION
TO PEACE-KEEPING AND A PROPOSED MILITARY MODEL IN SUPPORT
OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION ON THE SUB-CONTINENT**

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ABSTRACT

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Instability and conflict are common occurrences in Sub-Saharan Africa, often reaching catastrophic proportions. No solution has, as yet, been found. This study reflects on the causes of the problems and the attempts that have been made to solve them. This study then identifies the unique problems experienced by African militaries in conducting peace operations. The paper then argues that a potential solution, to alleviate some of the problems, has emerged in the form of the 'new' South Africa. It then proposes a military model in support of conflict resolution on the sub-continent.

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INTRODUCTION

Sub-Saharan Africa has been subjected to much conflict in the recent past. This situation will likely continue into at least the short-term future. A comprehensive solution to this problem has, as yet, not been identified.

This paper highlights a partial solution to key aspects of African peace-keeping, and proposes a military model in support of conflict resolution on the sub-continent. The model only addresses the military component of conflict resolution. It is the author's belief that it is in this domain that many of the most pressing challenges occur.

This paper commences with a description of the instability on the sub-continent, highlighting the possible causes. The paper then continues with a discussion of significant conflicts that have occurred on the sub-continent and of the attempts to resolve them. This "background" is offered to illustrate the magnitude and complexity of the problem.

This is followed by an analysis of problems experienced by African militaries in the conduct of peace operations. The paper then addresses what the author perceives to be a key new

factor in potential conflict resolution efforts: namely the advent of majority rule in the Republic of South Africa, and the resulting potential for conflict resolution on the sub-continent. This discussion concludes with the introduction of a model for military activity in support of African conflict resolution.

CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA : A BRIEF BACKGROUND

African instability is not solely due to Africans themselves, but is often rooted in colonial and cold-war historical circumstance. This makes it an extremely complex problem to resolve, and one of such magnitude as to frustrate single-state solutions. Still, the time has arrived when Africans no longer can afford to look to external patrons to resolve problems of conflict in Africa. Africans are increasingly aware of this, and exhibit a growing determination to solve their own problems. This is occurring concurrently with a modest but encouraging increase in commitment to market economies, transparency in governance, and more realistic development strategies¹.

External powers played a critical role in shaping modern Africa, and this to such an extent that it has been said that "while Africans created and continue to create their own history, they do so under conditions that, in many cases, they

do not control"². A brief historical overview is thus important to an understanding of current African conditions.

The most dramatic phase of external involvement on the continent began with what is now called "the scramble for Africa"³ in the 1880's and 1890's. This resulted in the advent of European colonialism and ended, as far as most Africans are concerned, with majority rule in South Africa on 27 April 1994. Many Africans view the legacy of the colonial era as the root cause of the conflict and instability in Sub-Saharan Africa today.

To a degree, this attitude is warranted. Colonialism was inherently (though variably) exploitative. Colonial powers implemented social and economic policies that were generally contradictory to the norms of African life yet, the colonial experience was too short to thoroughly enculturate African populations to European norms. This more or less set the stage for future conflict. Africa, after decolonization, was left with artificial political boundaries which (in many cases) divided homogeneous peoples. New countries were now ruled by 'assimilated'⁴ African elites who were frequently more concerned with their own advancement and their own continued relationship with the former powers, than with the political and economic progress of their own people⁵. Stressing unity at the expense of political pluralism, a number of these new leaders adopted an autocratic approach to governing. This, in turn, stifled prospects for a "loyal opposition". Opposition

was often brutally suppressed, provoking conflict amongst opposition parties within the same country⁶.

In conjunction with the above, the colonial powers left behind a region already economically marginalised. This problem was compounded in individual countries by financial mismanagement and poor development strategies. African countries did not have the financial means to develop, and frequently lacked leaders with sufficient vision to provide well for the future. This led to the accumulation of vast debt⁷ which has been virtually impossible to service and which in turn has resulted in highly dependent or even collapsed economies.

This is the colonial legacy to which most Africans refer when discussing their problems. Educated Africans generally believe that "most of the festering regional crises that torment the continent... are rooted in one way or another in ill considered decolonization strategies driven by metropolitan interests"⁸.

Serious problems that affect Africa today are numerous. The most important of these include, very limited resources, unrealistic expectations and lack of opportunity, nationalist/secessionist aspirations, inept or oppressive leadership, proliferation of arms, massive urbanization which overwhelms national abilities to generate employment (leading to illegal immigration to perceived 'greener pastures'). In extreme cases, these problems have led to 'failed states'⁹.

In the author's view, other problems that will negatively affect Africa as the 21st century approaches include growing environmental degradation, an increasing incidence of AIDS, the possible large scale increase of drug marketing, and the fact that the continent is prone to natural disasters and other endemic diseases. These problems are not conducive to stability.

Unfortunately, violence has a considerable precedence on the continent. The fact that independence was won by many Africa countries through an armed struggle reinforces a tendency to resort to arms to solve problems.

ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN TO SOLVE CONFLICT IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA

Parts of Africa have almost continuously been subjected to conflict during the post-colonial era.

Probably the first case of significance occurred in the former Belgian Congo (now called Zaire). Belgium, the colonial metropole, was unwisely persuaded to grant independence in mid 1960 without any substantive preparation of the small national elite for its new role¹⁰. At the same time, Belgium sought to retain control of much of the colony's economic infra-structure. The result at independence was immediate breakdown of order, and chaos.

The UN deployed a force generally known by the acronym ONUC (A French rendering of "UN Organization-Congo") to try

and preserve a fragile national integrity. This was extremely difficult, as illustrated by the fact that while ONUC's initial mandate was to help the central government, during its first year there were up to "four governments", contending factions backed (to some degree) by outside powers who were equally at odds¹¹. ONUC, despite all these difficulties, eventually put down the separatist attempts, held the Congo together and achieved success, but at a very high cost. This not only included human lives (both civilian and military), but this deployment of nearly 20 000 UN military personnel¹² over a 4 year period cost roughly \$2 billion¹³.

Partly as a result of the "Congo experience", the UN shied away from deploying armed military forces for purposes of peace-keeping in Sub-Saharan Africa until 1989, when it became involved with the transition to independence in Namibia¹⁴. In the interim, Pan African efforts at conflict resolution shifted to the Organization of African Unity (OAU). This, the Africans had to accomplish using their own means, which were extremely limited. In the one major attempt at peace-operations (Chad, 1980-1981) the OAU proved entirely unequal to the task.

There are many continuing situations of instability on the African continent, and prospects for long-term tranquility in many areas seem very bleak if current trends prevail. For instance, in Guinea-Bissau, opposition to the current government is becoming more militant and there are rising

tensions with Senegal. In Nigeria, an increasingly vociferous (though brutally suppressed) opposition is trying to organize international sanctions against a seemingly interminable military regime. Mali faces an insurgency by pastoral 'Tuaregs'. There is a good prospect of genocide and civil war in Burundi. Zaire could implode at any moment in a cataclysm of violence. In Sierra Leone the civil war continues¹⁵. These are but a few examples of current instability on the continent.

Other significant questions remain. Will the tentative peace in Angola hold? Will Mozambique manage to lift itself out from the ashes of a bitter civil war or will unfulfilled expectations drive Mozambicans back to conflict? These are questions that only the future will answer!

The world in general and Africa in particular should take serious cognisance of the potential for serious regional instability. It makes good sense to refine existing conflict resolution mechanisms in preparation for conflict situations. This is particularly true of the UN and regional organizations.

To do this, a study of past and current efforts at conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance should provide relevant 'lessons learnt'. The following portion of this paper attempts to offer such lessons from a "military operations" perspective. This analysis will result in a proposed military mechanism/model to support future conflict resolution measures.

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY SUB-SAHARAN MILITARY COMPONENTS WITHIN THE SPHERE OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Sub-Saharan African military personnel have participated as observers and staff officers during United Nations peace operations throughout the world¹⁶.

African countries have proven willing to participate in peace operations in Africa and elsewhere. Although some of these operations were less than successful, Africans have gained a wealth of experience in both troop deployments and headquarters staff positions.

Africans have, of course, encountered a variety of problems in conducting peace operations. Many of these are cited by Henk (1996)¹⁷ and by participants in a 'South African Institute of International Affairs' conference held in July 1995¹⁸.

The problems can be divided into two distinct categories. The first consists of those problems experienced by African peace-keepers while conducting operations outside of Africa. The second category consists of those problems experienced by Africans while conducting peace-operations on the continent itself. Both categories are pertinent here, since Africans will continue to conduct both varieties. Several of the more salient problems are recounted below.

Africans engaged in peace operations have often concluded that they were treated by partners from other contingents as

second-rate soldiers¹⁹. International organizations have tended to deny Africans substantial leadership roles in multinational peace operations, and whether provided by other organizations or by their own countries, Africans have deemed logistic support provided them as inferior²⁰.

Lines of communication from African countries to their contingents deployed abroad are always a problem. The longer the lines, the more costly the operation becomes, especially when sizable forces are deployed. Apart from unfamiliarity with the natural and cultural environments, social aspects such as feedback to one's own country, and post and remuneration are always detrimentally affected. As is true elsewhere, African leaders are always concerned with explaining casualties to their own people, mission creep (where this leads to protracted length of deployment) and ambiguous mandates²¹.

The biggest concern that Africans have however, is that multinational organizations may abandon them when a situation may turn for the worse²². Africans recognize their reliance on these other organizations for financial and logistics support as a danger, fearing the possibility that they may be left to their own devices in a dangerous situation.

With these problems as background, the author argues that Africans should preferably be deployed on their own continent, where they will be closer to home and where they will find themselves in a more familiar environment²³. However, serving

on their own continent is not without problems itself as the following will indicate.

The most obvious problem facing Africans at home is one of economics: In the region, economic decline is the rule rather than the exception. Africans frequently encounter a "mismatch between desired ends and available means or resources to achieve them"²⁴. The Charter of the OAU makes substantial provision for conflict resolution²⁵ and sub-regional organizations such as the 'Economic Community Of West African States' (ECOWAS) and the 'Southern African Development Community' (SADC) have now included regional security in their protocols²⁶. All that is lacking is sufficient material resources to support these initiatives. This deficiency can be partially overcome by greater managerial competence within the regional and sub-regional organizations. These organizations do receive funds²⁷ for peace activities and available resources could be utilized more efficiently and effectively.

A second problem centers on "the ability of Africans to put aside national and individual prejudices in order to achieve the necessary cooperation"²⁸. A negative example is evident in the OAU's first peace-keeping attempt in Chad in 1981. Africans tend to view this effort as a failure. "Member states were divided on the mandate". The OAU lacked funds, which led to the contributing nations supporting their own contingents logistically. This caused the OAU to lose 'hands on' control²⁹. Africans will have to address this issue

comprehensively if future cooperation is to succeed. Dynamic leaders with considerable international credibility (such as Mr Nelson Mandela of South Africa), are now emerging on the African continent and the author is of the opinion that the solution to this problem lies firmly in their hands.

African contingents engaged in peace operations face other problems, such as lack of interoperability and poor serviceability of equipment, lack of uniform peace-operations doctrine and varying standards of expertise and performance. However, the author, believes these are secondary to the problems mentioned above and more easily overcome. If Africans are correct in their perception that "The Western world is not sensitive to African concerns and affairs"³⁰ they will have to overcome these problems and become the solution themselves. In this light, it must be said that although Africans have at times been known for their failures, they have achieved much success during their past participation in peace operations³¹ and this affords reason for confidence in African success in the future.

Effective military operations on the African continent require that military contingents are skilled in certain exotic specialties such as tracking, anti-mine warfare, low intensity conflict and law enforcement activities³². This makes African militaries ideal for conducting operations in this environment, since many African military establishments have retained these skills from recent liberation struggles.

The author is of the opinion that one major factor has been absent from this equation to bring about a more stable continent. This factor is the Republic of South Africa, which until recently has been excluded from any intensive interaction with other African countries on this issue. South Africa now offers Africa with a possible, albeit a partial, alternative to the resource dilemma.

SOUTH AFRICA: THE KEY ?

Prior to 1994, South Africa was very much isolated from the greater international community, due to social policies of the minority-run government. However on the 27th April 1994, South Africa held its first truly democratic, all inclusive election and the majority party was voted into power³³. This signaled a new era as far as South Africa's participation in World and African politics was concerned. South Africa was welcomed back into the World and African communities.

The electoral process had barely been completed when the debate was started as to what South Africa's role would be in helping to solve some of Africa's problems. With South Africa having a reasonably strong economic base (at least in comparison to other African countries³⁴) and an undoubtably powerful and proven military machine³⁵, the South African potential for good seemed unlimited.

The author is of the opinion that this optimism is well founded, due to three factors: firstly, the established governmental mechanisms that were already in place in South Africa; secondly, the attitude and approach of the current South African government towards other African countries; and thirdly, the manner in which the international community now views South Africa.

The new Government of South Africa that came to power in 1994 inherited a well-functioning, western style administration³⁶. The economy, although inhibited by sanctions, was stable and much stronger than that of any other African country. The military was well equipped and experienced. The military offered the new government an exemplary professionalism, nonpartisanship, support and loyalty, contributing immeasurably to the smooth transition to majority rule³⁷. The South African military establishment has considerable expertise in the African operational environment and by 1994 had successfully transitioned into a multi-racial/multi-ethnic force. These features seem very relevant to participation in peace operations in Africa.

The South African Government currently pursues a policy of co-operation, transparency and friendship³⁸ towards its African counterparts. This is very much evident in the support that the South African government has provided, since 1994, to countries such as Angola, Rwanda and Mozambique³⁹. This foreign policy is clearly articulated in a "South African Draft White

Paper on Defence", which states that South Africa will strive to seek defence co-operation with other states as a priority and strengthen security and defence fora in the region where applicable⁴⁰.

South Africa still must solve many domestic problems before the transition is complete. The challenges that it faces are inter-alia, internal ethnic conflict⁴¹, threats of secession⁴², land redistribution, integration and rationalization of seven military forces⁴³, implementation of housing reform, equality of education and affirmative action⁴⁴. These problems must be addressed and a firm domestic base be established before South Africa can engage effectively in large scale help and aid to the rest of Africa.

South Africa, however, is faced with a "Catch 22" situation. It cannot afford to totally neglect the external African situation while it attempts to solve its internal challenges. Leistner argues that this is based on three key facts⁴⁵. Firstly, the support that South Africa can expect to receive from organizations such as the European Union and the World Bank is influenced by its willingness to cooperate with neighboring countries. Secondly, instability in the region could exacerbate problems such as illegal immigrants, arms smuggling and drug trafficking, which would have an obviously negative impact on South Africa; thirdly, the outside world tends to assess South Africa's future prospects in the light of trends and events elsewhere in the region.

A SOUTH AFRICAN "STRATEGY"

With all this in mind, South Africa would be wise to divide its help to the rest of Africa into two strategies: A long term strategy that can be activated after the total completion of its political transition and a short term strategy that can be applied almost immediately.

The short term activities would serve to convey South Africa's good intentions in Africa to the international community, establish good relations with its African counterparts and familiarize South Africa with Africa's problems (and, perhaps alleviate some of these).

It is the author's belief that some of the short term regional support that can be rendered by South Africa without jeopardizing its domestic programs are as follows :

- Participate as negotiation and mediation teams as part of the OAU or other sub-regional organizations to support conflict resolution on the African continent.
- Render support and share knowledge and experience in the domain of environmental preservation.
- Actively participate in regional and sub-regional organizations with a view to assisting the increase in managerial competence.
- Establish fora by which South Africa can share the experiences of moving to a democracy with other nations in Africa that are moving in a similar direction.

- The sharing of technology in the fields of medicine, mining, agriculture and veterinary science.
- The conduct of military assistance training programs. (These would have to be conducted in such a manner as not to jeopardise the current military integration process.)
- Selective military weapon system and equipment sales at reasonable prices and then also only in support of the peace effort on the continent.

With these support mechanisms in place in the short term, it would signal South African commitment to regional conflict resolution, and would give substance to the proposed "peace operations" model that follows.

PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA : A PROPOSED MILITARY MODEL

This proposed model only addresses the military component of peace operations, including those aspects that the military should be concerned with prior to, during and after deployment in such operations. The model is based on the following points made previously:

- Africa has a history of conflict and instability and it would seem that this will persist in the future to varying degrees.

- There is an increasing willingness amongst Africans to solve their own problems.
- A number of African countries have extensive experience in peace operations.
- There are a number of factors that inhibit Africans in conducting successful peace operations on their own continent, the most pressing being the unavailability of resources.
- South Africa has the means, and (if inclined to do so) can be the catalyst in the implementation of successful peace operations in Africa in the future.

This proposed military model has as its central theme or base, the issue of resources, both financial and human. Financial resources are needed for equipment, remuneration of participants and operating costs.

This author is of the opinion that these financial costs can be covered, to a large degree, by African countries who are committed to regional stability: firstly, by the purchasing of equipment at reasonably low prices from South Africa;⁴⁶ secondly, by acquiring serviceable and compatible, redundant equipment from the USA⁴⁷; thirdly, by managing the funds made available to the OAU and other sub-regional organizations,⁴⁸ more effectively and efficiently. Here, South Africa can play a leading role.

As far as human resources are concerned, it is recommended by the author that Africa not maintain a standing peace force, as this can become extremely expensive and could have a variety of negative effects.⁴⁹

This model suggests that each country maintain its own military force, but with training emphasis placed on peace operations so as to be able to contribute effective forces to common efforts. Countries would be scheduled on a rotation basis to have military elements on a stand-by system so as to be able to react rapidly to any contingency. Commitment would be based on authority of the UN, sanctioned through the OAU. This will ensure that sufficient human resources are available continuously. Effectiveness of this system depends on three features: preparedness, training and early warning. Each of these will now be individually addressed.

The question of resources is a difficult issue with few totally satisfactory solutions. But once resources have been made available, it is possible to start to prepare to handle future conflicts. "Preparedness" in this model relates to equipment, and its availability on short notice.

In terms of force structure, a light infantry brigade should suffice as a rapid deployment force that could manage most conflicts in their initial stages. Equipment for a brigade would be broken down into sets for three battalions (each having its own HQ) and a brigade headquarters. This equipment would be prepositioned and preserved in four

different countries in Africa, making any conflict in sub-saharan Africa accessible to at least a battalion sized force on very short notice.

This model envisions that the equipment sets for the three battalions be prepositioned, one each in east Africa, west Africa and southern Africa respectively. The equipment for the Brigade HQ would be pre-positioned at the Army Battle School in South Africa⁵⁰.

The initial force employed and authorized by the OAU to contain a conflict will use the equipment stored at the positioning point closest to the conflict. As the need arises, this will be supplemented by forces using the equipment from the other positioning points. Of importance to this process is the maintenance and replacement of this equipment to ensure preparedness. Managing this effort should become the responsibility of the conflict resolution cell⁵¹ of the OAU, although considerable additional structuring will be required before that entity could effectively perform such a role.

While attention to equipment is important, this plan also requires intensive peace operations training. Training must again be subdivided into two categories: namely, individual country and combined training. Individual country training is the responsibility of each country and will not be addressed here. Combined training in peace operations is of critical importance. Uniformity of doctrine is essential during multi-national operations, as most future peace operations in Africa

will be. Various authorities have considered and advocated the establishment of a Pan-African Peace Training Center, a measure which would enhance the ideas offered here⁵².

A further useful development would be an 'African Peace Operations Council' comprised of instructors drawn from all the major military colleges and academies in Africa. Such a council could periodically meet to set up uniform doctrine, ensure that all the militaries follow common doctrine during their training, work through lessons learnt during peace operations deployments and revise the doctrine if necessary. The chairmanship of this council could rotate among participating countries. This measure may be less costly than a more permanent system.

"Early-Warning" is a third critical feature. If availability of resources, effective training and professional preparedness are to bear fruit, then it is imperative that an effective early warning system be put in place. This model suggests that the military component of the OAU's conflict resolution cell set up an information center at the OAU headquarters⁵³ and use a variety of means to collect information, analyze this information and keep the OAU management informed of situations on a daily basis. Sources that can be utilized are selected military attaches, sub-regional organizations and their security cells and even intelligence services of various countries if they are accessible. Admittedly, constructing such a capability will be

an enormously complex, difficult and unprecedented task. It will take time and much patience to build, but its potential usefulness is so great as to make the risk inherently worthwhile.

An important component of an early warning system is to have forces available to deploy for peace operations on very short notice. To accomplish this, the OAU should negotiate the implementation of a 'stand-by' duty roster with member countries. This model suggests that countries be asked to place a battalion strength maneuver force on permanent 'stand-by' alert. Support elements could be scheduled in the same manner. A Brigade HQ would be compiled by the OAU when and if the need arises.

A last aspect of scheduling would be to keep track of all available military transport aircraft in Africa as well as maintaining contact with civilian air fleets and external patrons with military airlift capabilities (for the prospect of possible leasing), so as to be able to move forces. This would be another task of the (OAU-based) "Information Center".

A last issue that the proposed model addresses is that of Command and Control. It is imperative that the UN sanction all peace operations undertaken on African soil, as this will lend legitimacy to the operations. The model suggests that the OAU, under the auspices of the UN, will always assume direct responsibility and authority for such operations. The OAU can authorize sub-regional organizations such as SADC, and ECOWAS

to conduct these operations on behalf of the OAU.

I would argue that the OAU should never divorce itself completely from any African peace operation, because it is the only organization that represents the entire continent. Military Commanders will be appointed by the OAU and these commanders in turn will be responsible to report back to the OAU directly or via the sub-regional organization (where that is the applicable sponsor). The OAU, in its turn, will continuously keep the UN informed as to the status of the peace operation. This link is extremely important, especially if additional external support is needed, which is possible for the UN to put into effect.

It is the opinion of the author that if this model is implemented, it could resolve many African conflict situations before they escalate into dire human catastrophes.

CONCLUSION

Sub-Saharan Africa is a continent faced by many difficult challenges. Its many problems often lead to conflict, which in turn produces tremendous human suffering. External powers are not likely to offer substantial assistance in the future: indeed, they exhibit increasing "donor fatigue". Africans realize this, and are increasingly willing to deal with their problems themselves. However, they lack the resources to resolve many of the problems. In the intermediate future, it

is unlikely that Africans will find sufficient resources without at least some outside assistance.

The Republic of South Africa, recently welcomed back into the African 'fold' after years of pariah status, may offer a potential to alleviate some of the resource problems. Although South Africa still has many domestic issues to resolve before it can provide large-scale assistance, it can provide limited support almost immediately. This may be sufficient to encourage Africans to conduct their own peace operations on the continent. Resources which South Africa brings to the 'table' could support the model for peace operations offered here.

The proposed model only addresses the military component of peace operations. It is based on the premise that if resources, training, preparedness, early-warning and (above all), command and control are effectively utilized, then this will lead to a successful military response to conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa.

END NOTES

1. Evidence of this is seen in countries such as Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Uganda, Tanzania, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Ghana, South Africa, Senegal and Namibia. Although these countries face many challenges, they are moving in a positive direction as can be deduced from a brief overview in Africa Confidential Vol 37, No 2 (19 January 1996): 03.
2. See Thomas O'Toole, "The Historical Context" in Gordon, A and Gordon, D, Eds., Understanding Contemporary Africa. London: Lynne Rienner, 1992. p 21.
3. See Crawford Young, "The Heritage of Colonialism" in J.W. Harbeson and D. Rothchild, Eds., Africa in World Politics Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. p 23.
4. This concept was used especially by the French and Portuguese. They gave selected local elites of their colonies the opportunity to be educated in return for their loyalty to the colonial masters. Many of these 'elites' found themselves in power in their respective countries upon decolonization.
5. See Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "The Political Economy of African Personal Rule" in Apter and Rosberg, Eds., Political Development and the New Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa, USA: University Press of Virginia, 1994. p 292, 296.
6. Ibid., p. 300-302.
7. Ibid., p. 314.
8. See Crawford Young, 24-25.
9. Two current examples of this phenomena are Liberia and Somalia, where UN and regional (OAU) and sub-regional (ECOWAS) sponsored peace and humanitarian operations have failed, to date, to restore a climate conducive to reconstruction, reconciliation and development.
10. See William J. Durch, "The UN Operation in the Congo" in W.J Durch, Ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping. USA: St Martin's Press, 1993. P 316.
11. Ibid., p. 346.
12. Ibid., p. 330.
13. Ibid., p. 331.

14. Ibid., p. 348.

15. Africa Confidential. Vol 37, No 2 (19 January 1996): 03.

16. See Henk D, "Africans and Peace Operations: Views From Southern and Eastern Africa". p 2, 8. Examples include Ghana during 'United Nations Emergency Force 2' in the Sinai. Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia during the 'United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group' in the Middle East and except for Zambia, again during the 'United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission'. Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia and Mali during 'Operation Des Nations Unies Au Congo' in the Congo. Congo, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Zimbabwe during the 'United Nations Angola Verification Mission 2/3' in Angola. Other Peace operations that have been extensively supported by Africans are those conducted in Liberia (solely African), Somalia, Rwanda and Mozambique.

17. Ibid., p. 30-36.

18. See the address delivered by Lt Col Katumba-Wamala of Uganda to a audience attending the South African Institute Of International Affairs conference on "South Africa and Peace-keeping in Africa" in July 1995. The Address was entitled "The Concept of Peace-Keeping Operations in Africa".

19. See Henk D, 32.

20. Ibid., p. 31.

21. Ibid., p. 30.

22. Ibid., p. 34.

23. The author, being a South African military officer, has had the experience of operating with indigenous Africans in different regions. It is his observation that such soldiers performed well wherever they operated or were deployed. The author further contends that it is his experience that Africans generally 'understand' Africans.

24. See Henk D, 10.

25. See "The Charter of the Organization of African Unity". Article XIX.

26. See Lt Col Katumba-Wamala, 04.

27. See the address entitled "Africa Programs in the FY 1996 Budget: Protecting Long-Term U.S. Interests" by George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, which was delivered before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of

the Senate Appropriations Committee in Washington, DC, on March 28, 1995. The address appeared in the DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management, Vol 17 No 4. p 71-80.

28. See Henk D, 48.

29. See Lt Col Katumba-Wamala, 06.

30. See Henk D, 08.

31. Ibid., p. 04.

32. Ibid., p. 46.

33. See the preface by the President of South Africa in the manual "National Symbols of the Republic of South Africa". 1995. p 02.

34. See manual compiled by the Economics Division, Standard Bank of South Africa Limited: South Africa: An Economic Profile. 1993. p 05.

35. See Metz S, "Pretoria's Total Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare in Southern Africa" in Comparative Strategy, Vol 6 No 4. 1987. p 448-458.

36. With the ending of 'Apartheid' the new government now found itself in control of a country richly endowed with mineral resources and with a well established industrial base which, although inhibited by international sanctions, had already positioned itself to some degree in the international environment.

37. See Metz S and Butts K.H. Armies and Democracy in the New Africa: Lessons from Nigeria and South Africa. USAWC: SSI. 1996. p 06.

38. See "Africa Confidential", Vol 36 No 17. 25 August 1995. p 03.

39. See "It's all about Supporting Peace" by Lt Corlize Viljoen in 'Salut', Vol 2 No 9. September 1995. p 25.

40. See "Draft White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa". 21 June 1995. p 05-06.

41. There is still, at the time of writing, ethnic conflict occurring in the RSA, and especially in the Kwazulu-Natal region.

42. This refers to the periodic threats from the Inkatha

Freedom Party, who currently control the province of Kwazulu-Natal, to secede from the rest of the RSA.

43. The military forces to be integrated into the new SANDF (and then rationalized) are the old SADF, the militaries of the four independent states (only recognized by the RSA) of Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei, and the liberation armies of the African National Congress (Umkonto Wi Sizwe) and the Pan African Congress (Azanian Peoples Liberation Army).

44. This is one of the natural steps to be taken to correct the inequalities of the Apartheid system.

45. See "Prospects of Increasing Regional Cooperation: A South African Perspective" by Dr E. Leistner in 'Africa Insight', Vol 25 No 1. 1995. p 01.

46. South Africa has a sophisticated weapons industry. The author believes that South Africa would want to support peace operations in Africa.

47. This refers to the U.S military 'Excess Defense Articles' (EDA) program and policy.

48. This refers to organizations such as the UN and the EU and countries such the U.S. and others that have an interest in Africa.

49. A National Peacekeeping Force, comprising of elements of all the military and police forces prevalent in the country at the time was established in South Africa in 1993. The idea behind this concept was to supposedly provide a neutral security force to aid the transition to majority rule. It was a failure and resulted in this force being disbanded before the transition. The author is of the opinion that the same flaws that were inherent in that force will be prevalent in any standing African Force.

50. The reason for this choice of locale is that equipment for such an organization is already present, and this facility could be utilized to train all potential African Brigade staff officers. Exercises are regularly held there and these could be used in an integrated fashion to include the training of African staff officers.

51. A newly created organization with the express purpose of addressing conflicts on the African continent.

52. See Metz S and Butts K,H, 36.

53. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

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